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I. Introduction 
Ease of information flow is both the boon and the bane 
of large-scale, decentralized systems like the World Wide 
Web.  For all the benefits and opportunities brought by the 
information revolution, with that same revolution have 
come the challenges of inappropriate use.  Sensitive 
personal data disclosed, corporate secrets revealed, 
copyrighted material distributed without permission, 
confidential records shared among organizations in 
violation of regulation and policy -- these breaches of 
established social norms and laws have become part of 
everyday life in the Information Age.  Such excesses and 
abuses in the use of information are most commonly 
viewed through the lens of information security.  They are 
seen as consequences of unauthorized access, the result of 
information “escaping” beyond an appropriate boundary.  
Accordingly, enormous effort in current information 
technology research and development is devoted to 
inventing more reliable methods for restricting access to 
information. 
These efforts notwithstanding, access restriction alone is 
inadequate for addressing information misuse on the 
Internet.  An exclusive reliance on access restriction leads 
to technology and policy strategies in which information, 
once revealed, is completely uncontrolled.  It’s like 
focusing all one’s attention on closing the barn door and 
ignoring what might happen to the horses after they’ve 
escaped.  The reality is that even when information is 
widely available, society has interests in whether or not 
that information is used appropriately.   Information 
policies should reflect those interests, and information 
technology should support those policies. 
Even when access restriction can be perfectly and 
completely achieved, there are significant cases where 
policies implemented purely as ex ante (up front) controls 
are too rigid to faithfully reflect societal needs.  One 
example is copyright control and the need to accommodate 
fair use.  Another might be in determining whether law-
enforcement agencies can permissibly share information 
about targets of investigations.  Traditionally, law and 
policy address such complexity through enforcement 
mechanisms where control is imperfect and exceptions are 
possible, but where violators can be identified and held 
accountable.  Information technology infrastructure should 
do likewise. 
This paper argues that debates over online privacy, 
copyright, and information policy questions have been 
overly dominated by the access restriction perspective. We 
propose an alternative to the "hide it or lose it" approach 
that currently characterizes policy compliance on the Web. 
Our alternative is to design systems that are oriented 
toward information accountability and appropriate use, 
rather than information security and access restriction.  In 
a world where information is ever more easily copied and 
aggregated, and where automated correlations and 
inferences across multiple databases can uncover 
information even when it has not been explicitly revealed, 
accountability must become a primary means by which 
society addresses issues of appropriate use. 
Our goal is to extend the Web architecture to support 
transparency and accountability. When information has 
been used, it should to possible to determine what 
happened, and to pinpoint use that is inappropriate.  This 
requires augmenting Web information with data about 
provenance and usage policies, and creating automated 
means for maintaining that provenance and interpreting 
policies.  Transparency and accountability can be 
supported by a set of technical mechanisms we call Policy 
Awareness.  Policy Awareness is a property of information 
systems that provides all participants with accessible and 
understandable views of the policies associated with 
information resources, provides machine-readable 
representations of policies in order to facilitate compliance 
with stated rules, and enables accountability when rules are 
intentionally or accidentally broken. Our understanding of 
the dilemmas of information policy in the age of the Web 
is built upon the work of numerous legal academics1 and 
writers2. Our proposed public policy and systems 
architecture framework is an effort integrate these insights 
into a comprehensive framework of law and technology 
that, while not immediately providing answers to all legal 
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or technical design questions, sets out a direction in which 
we are likely see the Web and other large-scale systems 
evolve toward greater accountability. 
Transparency and accountability make bad acts visible 
to all concerned. This visibility alone does not guarantee 
compliance. Then again, the vast majority of legal and 
social rules that form the fabric of our societies are not 
enforced perfectly or automatically, yet somehow most of 
us follow most of the rules most of the time. We do so 
because social systems built up over thousands of years 
encourage us to do so and often make compliance easier 
than violation. Social rules are known to us in a transparent 
manner, though often in the tacit dimension of our 
environment3. For those comparatively rare cases where 
rules are broken, we are all aware that we may be held 
accountable through a process that looks back through the 
records of our actions and assesses these actions against 
the rules. Augmenting systems with Policy Awareness is 
an attempt to bring to the Web and other information 
architectures at least to the level of transparency and 
accountability that we have in other arenas where human 
interaction is governed by social rules. 
II. Challenges to the Information Hiding 
Approach to Policy Compliance 
Personal privacy, copyright protection, and government 
data mining are examples of the sorts of areas that present 
significant policy challenges for the information society. It 
has been more than a decade since stable policy regimes in 
these areas have been upset by the rise of network 
computing and the World Wide Web. Yet society still 
seems far from robust technical or public-policy solutions 
to these problems. In each of these cases, we believe that 
excessive reliance on secrecy and up-front control over the 
flow of information has resulted in policies that fail to meet 
social needs and technologies that stifle information flow 
without actually resolving the problems for which they are 
designed.  
A. Privacy 
Information privacy rights, at their core, seek to 
safeguard individual autonomy as against the power that 
institutions or individuals may gain over others through use 
of sensitive, personal information4.  Policy makers worry 
that sensitive, and possibly inaccurate, information will be 
used against people in financial, employment or healthcare 
settings. Democratic societies also worry that citizens' 
behavior will be unduly restrained if they fear they are 
being watched at every turn. They may not read 
controversial material, or they may feel inhibited from 
associating with certain communities for fear of adverse 
consequences. 
Society has typically sought to safeguard information 
privacy rights by limiting the collection of, or access to, 
personal information5. The privacy of email messages or 
telephone calls is protected by prohibiting access to and 
disclosure of the stored message data or interception of the 
audio signal except under very limited circumstances. 
Personal bank balances are kept secret from all except 
authorized bank personnel.  Medical records are protected 
from public view. In countries with comprehensive data 
protection laws (including the EU, Canada, Hong Kong, 
and Australia) no personal information can be collected 
about individuals at all without their affirmative consent. 
Today, however, with the proliferation of personal 
information on the World Wide Web and the increased 
analytic power available to everyone through facilities 
such as Google, preventing access to or collection of a 
given piece of data is often without real privacy benefit.6 
Worse, many privacy protections, such as the lengthy 
privacy policy statements we receive online or in health or 
financial services contexts, are mere fig leaves over the 
increasing transparency of our social and commercial 
interactions. Either the same information is available 
elsewhere on the Web in public, or it is possible to infer 
private details to a very high degree of accuracy from other 
information that itself is public.7  What's more, in the case 
of publicly available personal information, people often 
make this data about themselves available intentionally, 
not just by accident. They may not intend that it be used 
for every conceivable purpose, but they are willing for it to 
be public nonetheless. 
With personal information so widely available, privacy 
protection through information hiding and access control is 
largely ineffective.  As a case in point, the growth of 
electronic commerce on the Web over the second half of 
the 1990’s sparked a concern about consumer privacy that 
led to an emphasis on Web site privacy policies, and 
infrastructure like the World Wide Web Consortium’s 
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P).  Today, most 
consumer Web sites post privacy policies, and popular 
browsers make use of P3P for the purpose of restricting the 
placement of cookies that violate self-regulatory norms 
agreed to by the online advertising industry. However, P3P 
did not succeed as effective privacy management tool 
beyond the control of cookie usage. 
Much has changed about the Web since P3P was 
designed over ten years ago. The design target for P3P in 
the mid 1990s was the largely bilateral relationship 
between an individual consumer and a Web site. At most a 
third party advertiser was also involved. Today far more 
complex multi-party exchanges of information are the 
norm. P3P does not today suffice as a comprehensive 
technological support for privacy on the Web because of 
growing tensions in the “notice and choice” model of Web 
privacy.  A fully-implemented P3P environment could give 
Web users the ability to make privacy choices about every 
single request to collection information about them. 
However, the number, frequency and specificity of those 
choices would be overwhelming especially if the choices 
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must consider all possible future uses by the data collector 
and third parties.   Consumers should not have to agree in 
advance to complex policies with unpredictable outcomes.  
Instead, they should be confident that there will be redress 
if they are harmed by improper use of the information they 
provide, and otherwise they should not have to think about 
this at all. 
Consider this scenario:  Alice has a three-year old child 
with a severe chronic illness that requires long-term 
expensive treatment.  Alice tries to learn all that she can 
about the illness, buying books about the disease online, 
searching on the Web using AOL, and participating on 
online support parent support chat rooms.  One day Alice 
applies for job and is rejected.   She suspects it’s because a 
background check somehow learned about her Web 
activities and flagged her as high risk for expensive family 
health costs. 
Stories like this are often put forth as cautionary tales to 
support the need for Web privacy policies.  Did the book 
store assert that the titles of Alice’s purchases would be 
kept confidential?  Did AOL promise never to release 
information about Alice’s online searches?  Did the chat 
service guard against lurkers in the chat room recording the 
names of participants?  A policy regime based on data 
hiding would focus on these potential acts of data release, 
perhaps even taking the position that it should be Alice’s 
responsibility to inform herself about these Web sites’ 
privacy policies before using the services.  That focus is 
misplaced: the actual harm was caused not by the 
disclosure of information by the bookseller or AOL or the 
chat service, but by the decision to deny Alice the job, i.e., 
by the inappropriate use of that information. In fact, it is 
quite conceivable that Alice actually wants to be identified 
as someone who has an interest in this particular illness. 
Forcing her to hide in order to protect herself against 
improper information usage significantly limits her ability 
to exercise her right to freedom of association. Instead, we 
should instead be able to live in online environments which 
provide transparency of information usage and 
accountability to rules that limit harmful uses of personal 
information. In sections III and IV we discuss the legal and 
technical framework to enable accountability to privacy 
rules. 
B. Copyright 
Copyright control for information on the Internet poses 
challenges similar to those of privacy.  It presents similar 
opportunities for information policy to take better 
advantage of transparency and accountability, thereby 
coming to rely less on secrecy and access restriction.  As 
with privacy, the increased flow of copyrighted 
information brings enormous benefits, but there are also 
associated risks – here the risk that copyright holders will 
lose control over their works altogether and suffer massive 
infringement. 
In the copyright context, information hiding commonly 
takes the form of digital rights management (DRM) 
systems, where information flows through the Web in 
encrypted form, and decryption keys that unlock the 
information are granted pursuant to licenses that users 
negotiate.  As with privacy, it has proved extremely 
difficult to keep information reliably locked up, and efforts 
at up-front control over the information flow results in user 
frustration and substantially imperfect security.  The 
recording industries have long believed that music sold 
online must have copy protection in place in order to ward 
off the possibility if large-scale illegal copying of their 
digital assets. Yet it has become clear that illegal file-
sharing on the Internet won't be stopped by 
inconveniencing honest consumers. There are enough 
sophisticated copyright infringers who continue to populate 
illegal Internet services with stolen content regardless of 
the technical limits music publishers may erect.  Recently, 
Apple's CEO Steve Jobs wrote8 that DRM has not worked 
and is never likely to. Soon afterwards, Apple changed the 
way it sells music online by offering a more expensive 
version unencumbered by technical copy protection 
measures that have typically been present in online music 
sales. There is one catch, however, to Apple’s elimination 
of DRM. These unlocked tracks have embedded inside 
them the name and other personally-identifying 
information of the purchaser. That way, if he or she shares 
the purchased music with their hundred million closest 
friends on MySpace or elsewhere, there is a chance the 
purchaser can be held accountable. 
Experience with online copyright has shown, in a pattern 
also similar to the privacy dilemma, that attempting to 
realize social policy goals through access control 
mechanisms can become extraordinarily complex.  With 
copyright, it’s been common for access controls to go 
beyond the statutory rights reserved to copyright holders 
and impose additional restrictions. The notable example of 
in the US and many other jurisdictions is the doctrine of 
Fair Use.   Fair uses, by their very nature, are unauthorized 
by the copyright holder, and involve the determination by a 
court, after the fact, of whether what would otherwise have 
been copyright infringement was in fact permissible.   
Some legal scholars maintain that fair use requires that 
users should not need to request permission from copyright 
holders in advance, or must get access even when 
permission has been requested and refused, requirements 
that seem fundamentally inconsistent with access control.9  
Several proposals have been advanced for surmounting this 
inconsistency, including taking big steps towards 
accountability architectures through systems that permit 
users to override access controls, in which case the access 
is logged, presumably with something like the 
accountability architecture we describe below.10 Switching 
from access control architectures to accountability 
architectures does little to reduce the complexity of fair use 
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determinations, but it at least provides a framework where 
fair use arguments can be addressed.   
One of the great promises of the Web is that it can be 
much more than just a distribution network for consumer 
content, but rather, a vast arena for collaboration, where 
creators can build on each other’s work.  The appropriate 
infrastructure to support this goal is a architecture not of 
access control but of accountability.  One example is 
provided by the Creative Commons organization, which 
promotes a family of copyright licenses that encourage the 
flow of information but retain certain rights for the work's 
creator.11  For example, some licenses might proscribe 
commercial redistribution of licensed works; some licenses 
might permit distribution but prohibit making derivatives; 
some licenses might permit making and redistributing 
derivatives, but only under the terms of the original 
license. 
Creative Commons has also developed a Rights 
Expression Language that recasts these licensing terms in 
machine readable form, thus enabling licensed works to 
participate in accountability architectures.  For example, 
there is a browser plug-in that identifies when a visited 
page is under a Creative Commons license, and alerts the 
user with information about the licensing terms.12  This 
presents the technical challenge of extending the 
architecture to provide support for accountability when 
content under different licenses is mixed, a task that is just 
beginning to be explored.13 
The Creative Commons approach does not seek perfect 
enforcement of the licenses up front, as DRM does.  In 
fact, the Creative Commons organization takes the position 
that its licensing terms are incompatible with DRM 
systems, since the terms require redistribution of licensed 
works in a way that preserves fair use.  Rather, the 
Creative Commons architecture recognizes the value of 
having information flow around the Internet quite freely 
but still seeks to impose certain restrictions on how the 
information can be used. While the ultimate enforcement 
of these conditions flows from the force of law, Creative 
Commons also illustrates how technical tools, such as 
those the make licenses visible and allow for machine 
computation of the effect of overlapping licenses, can 
come together to make it easier for users to comply with 
complex rules in a dynamic information space. 
Aside from meeting a particular set of open access goals, 
this approach to copyright rules has is actually much closer 
to the operation of copyright law in the offline world 
(books, movies, etc.) than is the DRM-controlled world 
that some publishers have turned to on the Internet. It is a 
system of online information accountability that does a far 
better job of reflecting the traditional relationship between 
legal rules and human behavior than do more restrictive 
copyright technologies. The force of law behind the 
Creative Commons licenses is no less forceful than other 
online copyright regimes, but it takes an approach that is 
better tuned to the fluid nature of information on the Web.  
C. Surveillance and Data Mining 
Recent government uses of advanced data mining 
techniques are yet another example of the deficiency of 
access control and collection limitation approaches to 
privacy compliance on the Web. Data mining holds out the 
promise of being an important new component of terrorism 
detection and prevention, and perhaps even criminal 
investigation, but raises at the same time a whole new 
category of privacy challenges.14  The power of data 
mining technology lies in its potential to bring to light non-
obvious investigation targets or identify terrorist threats 
through inferences drawn on decentralized data sets spread 
around the Web, i.e. around the world. Traditional public 
policy tools appear inadequate to the task of protecting 
basic privacy rights in this situation. The vast majority of 
data through which government agencies are mining is 
either available for access with minimal legal process, or, 
in many cases, is already public. Laws that limit access to 
information will not protect privacy here because so much 
of the data is publicly available. Taken item by item there 
is little legal basis for controlling access to this 
information, but the intrusive power comes from the 
aggregation of large numbers of data sources. To date, the 
law has not developed any way to address this privacy 
loophole. 
Current technical investigations of the impact of data 
mining on privacy have generally focused on limiting 
access to data at the point of collection or storage. Much 
effort has been put into the application of cryptographic 
and statistical techniques to construct finely tuned access-
limiting mechanisms.15 Yet for all this emphasis on access 
restriction, the reality is that the Web is making it 
increasingly difficult to limit access to data, while at the 
same time making it increasingly easy to aggregate data 
from multiple information sources, and to do searching and 
inferencing based on these aggregations. 
The case of airline passenger screening activities by law 
enforcement and national security agencies, for example, 
illustrate the growing complexity of information handling 
and transfer. Society may be prepared to accept and even 
expect national security agencies to use very aggressive 
data mining techniques over a wide range of information in 
order to identify potential terrorism risks. However, we 
consider it unacceptable to use the same information with 
the same powerful analytic tools in order to investigate 
domestic criminal activity. Therefore, we need rules that 
address permissible uses of certain classes of information, 
in addition to simply access and collection limitations. Our 
initial research in this area16 has shown that transparency of 
data access and tools which provide accountability to 
clearly-stated usage-oriented rules can be a viable 
alternative to failed access control techniques.  
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III. Information Accountability as a Legal 
Framework 
The information accountability framework has the 
advantage that it more closely mirrors the long-standing 
relationship between law and human behavior than do the 
various efforts at forcing policy compliance through access 
control over information. Upon reflection we realize that 
the rule of law in society operates largely in the 
background of our activity. Overall, compliance with the 
law is very high in democratic societies, yet in the vast 
majority of cases there are no mechanisms that force us to 
comply with legal or social rules.17 Rather, we comply 
because rules are generally known and social institutions 
tend to make compliance easier than violation. As a final 
backstop, if we are tempted to break rules, we are aware 
that there is a rich web of institutional and social forces 
that make it more likely than not that our rule breaking will 
eventually be discovered. 
There is a significant paradox associated with protecting 
privacy or other information policy values through 
increased transparency. Must we collect more information, 
much of which may be personal and sensitive, in order to 
protection privacy? In many cases it is only by making 
better use of the information that is collected, and by 
retaining what is necessary to hold data users responsible 
for policy compliance that we can actually achieve greater 
information accountability. We should, of course, to the 
maximum extent possible protect the data that is stored for 
accountability purposes. Creating new points of failure in 
an already insecure Internet environment is not an 
attractive strategy, but in most cases the data needed to 
ensure accountability is already collected somewhere. Our 
goal is to be sure that this data is organized, annotated and 
available to be used for better policy compliance and 
accountability. 
A. Models for regulating large-scale 
information systems 
Transparency and accountability lie at the root of many 
legal regimes generally regarded as successful. In 
particular, two legal systems responsible for regulating 
large-scale information environments in the United States 
–  the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Securities Act –
illustrate that it is possible to achieve substantial control 
over how information is used without the tight, upfront 
control sought by policy/technology designs inspired by 
the traditional computer security model. 
Fair Credit Reporting Act 
One of the earliest large-scale uses of personal 
information in the private sector is the consumer credit 
reporting system. This system generates credit risk 
assessments for use in lending and employment decisions. 
From early on, policymakers recognized the need to 
protect individual privacy, assure accuracy of the data, all 
while maintaining enough flexibility in the operation of the 
system to allow a thorough analysis of consumer credit 
data based on the maximum amount of useful information 
possible.  
The Fair Credit Reporting Act18, the statute that 
regulates the credit bureaus, their users and data sources, 
has balanced these three regulatory goals by constructing 
the rules such that the credit bureaus are permitted to 
collect very wide range of information. Privacy is 
protected not by limiting collection of data, but rather by 
placing strict rules on how the data may be used. Analysis 
for the purpose of developing a credit score is essentially 
unconstrained, but the resulting information can be used 
only for credit or employment purposes. It cannot, for 
example, be used for marketing or profiling. Strict 
penalties are imposed if these use limitations are breached. 
Data quality is assured by giving all consumers the right to 
see the data held about them (transparency). And, if a user 
of the data makes a decision adverse to the consumer 
(denial of a loan or rejection of an employment 
application) that decision must be justified with reference 
to the specific data in the credit report upon which the 
decision was based (accountability). If the consumer 
discovers that this data is inaccurate, s/he may demand that 
it be corrected. Again, there are stiff financial penalties 
imposed against the credit bureau if the bureau fails to 
make the appropriate corrections.  
Taken together, these provisions of the fair credit statute 
are an example of an information regulation regime that 
achieves is goals by setting usage rules, not access or 
collection rules. It relies on transparency and 
accountability, as opposed to any effort at up-front 
enforcement of the rules. There is no guarantee that all data 
in the credit system is accurate or even that it will be used 
according to the rules. However, there is a robust feedback 
loop built in to correct errors and strict penalties when rule 
violations are discovered. 
Some may be surprised by the idea that the consumer 
credit bureaus should be used as a model for any future 
regulation. It is the case that people come into contact with 
this system often when there is a problem with its 
operation. However, given the scale of the system, 
comprising data about most adults in the United States, 
collecting data from hundreds of millions of sources and 
providing analysis to hundreds of thousands of users, and 
the high stakes decisions the system is responsible for 
supporting, this system is an important model for 
regulation of large scale, decentralized information 
systems. 
Securities law 
A large part of the commercial economy of the United 
States rests on a foundation of transparency and 
accountability. Four times per year tens of thousands of 
public companies are required to file detailed information 
about their financial status. The Securities and Exchange 
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Commission sets rules specifying exactly what information 
must be disclosed and maintains copies of all of these 
documents for public examination. Were we not so 
accustomed to this system, one might characterize the 
transparency requirements as nothing less than radical: 
disclosure is required for everything from sensitive 
financial data, executive compensation details, and current 
threats to the company's economic prospects. 
The only up-front enforcement that goes on is the 
requirement that the report itself be filed. The SEC 
generally does not look at the content or check the 
accuracy of the filings at all. Instead, accountability to 
substantive rules and duties of financial management is 
achieved because shareholders, their lawyers, or in very 
rare cases government prosecutors will examine SEC 
filings of companies whose financial position is in doubt 
for some reason. If a company's filing is either inaccurate 
or incomplete, there are then serious penalties. As with the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, this is a regulatory system that 
relies on thorough transparency and after-the-fact 
accountability for behavior that is discovered to be illegal. 
IV. Technical Architectures for End-to-End 
Information Accountability 
What technical architecture is required to support 
information accountability? We have demonstrated in the 
case of privacy and copyright that compliance and 
accountability challenges arise from the extreme free flow 
of information. Thus we can no longer reliably achieve 
policy goals by merely limiting access to information at 
one point on the Web. Exercising control at one point in a 
large information space ignores the very real possibility 
that the same data is either available or inferable from 
somewhere else. Thus, we have to engineer Policy Aware 
systems based on design principles suitably robust for 
Web-scale information environments. Here we can learn 
from the design principles that enabled the Internet and the 
Web to function in a globally-coordinated fashion without 
having to rely on a single point of control.  
The need for information accountability illustrates in the 
policy compliance arena what Internet architects learned 
about communications protocols as they successfully 
deployed highly decentralized network services at a scale 
not previously achievable with traditional, centralized 
network design. The shift in emphasis from access control 
to accountability in data privacy is analogous to the shift 
from careful step-by-step relay protocols to end-to-end19 
protocols in communications networks. In these networks 
responsibility for correct behavior belongs at the end points 
of the communication system, rather than at the 
intermediate relay points.  Effort to ensure correct behavior 
at the relay points, beyond that needed to obtain 
performance, is usually wasted.  Much of credit for the 
robust behavior of the Internet is due to this design choice 
for the protocols.  The analogous idea here is that the 
purpose of privacy is to protect holders of personal 
information from adverse consequences of the misuse of 
that information.  Efforts to ensure perfect access control at 
each step of an information transfer may not be as effective 
as making sure that adverse consequences of misuse can be 
mitigated.  
Applying the lessons of end-to-end design to the goal of 
building policy aware systems, we must then ask how we 
can build accountability features into every node of the 
Web at which information is used, and how will these 
highly distributed accountability functions will come to be 
integrated into system-wide accountability.  
A. An initial Policy Aware architecture 
Information accountability on the Web will emerge from 
the development of three basic capabilities: policy-aware 
audit logging, a policy language framework, and 
accountability reasoning tools. 
Policy Aware transaction logs: In a decentralized 
system each endpoint will have to assume the 
responsibility of recording information usage events that 
may be relevant to current or future assessment of 
accountability to some set of policies. These logs will 
become the basis of assessing policy accountability either 
in real time or at some point in the future when such an 
assessment is needed. A policy-aware transaction log will 
initially resemble traditional network and database 
transaction logs, but also include data provenance, 
annotations about how the information was used, and what 
rules are known to be associated with that information. 
Policy-aware logging, not unlike TCP/IP packet routing is 
a relatively dumb operation that is oblivious to the 
semantics of the subject of log entries. What matters is that 
events are logged. Other tools will be responsible for 
analysis and action based on the content of the logs. A 
number of fundamental questions must be answered about 
logs, however: what information should be kept and what 
discarded? How will the logs themselves be secured? How 
will integrity be assured? 
Policy Language Framework: Assessing policy 
compliance over a set of transactions logged at a 
heterogeneous set of Web endpoints by a diversity of 
human actors requires some common framework for 
describing policy rules and restrictions with respect to the 
information being used. We consider it improbable in the 
extreme that the entire world would ever agree on a single 
set of policy language primitives. However, drawing on 
semantic web techniques including ontologies and rules 
languages, we believe it will be possible for larger and 
larger overlapping communities on the Web to develop a 
shared policy vocabulary in a step-by-step, bottom-up 
fashion. Perfect global interoperability of these policies is 
unlikely but that is not a fatal flaw. Just as human societies 
learn to cope with overlapping and sometimes 
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contradictory rules, especially when jurisdictional 
boundaries are crossed, so too will policy aware systems be 
able to develop at least partial interoperability. Partial 
decidability is also fact in today's legal systems and it will 
be so online as well. 
Policy Reasoning Tools: Accountable systems must 
assist users in seeking answers to questions such as: Is this 
piece of data allowed to be used for a given purpose? Is a 
string of inferences permissible for use in a given context, 
depending on the provenance of the data and the applicable 
rules. It seems likely that special purpose reasoners, based 
on specializations of general logic frameworks, will be 
needed to provide a scalable and open policy reasoner.20 
An initial application of these reasoners has been 
implementation of policy aware access control21 that enable 
standard web servers to enforce ruled-based access control 
policies specifying constraints and permissions with 
respect to the semantics of the information in the 
controlled resources and elsewhere on the Web. 
B. Implementation and Deployment Strategy 
A critical consideration in making the Web policy-aware 
is whether this would require significant re-architecting of 
basic Internet and Web protocols, or whether transparency 
and accountability can be layered on top of existing 
infrastructure.22  One possible approach to doing the latter 
is through collection of accountability appliances23 that are 
distributed throughout the Web and communicate using 
Web-based protocols, both among themselves and with 
other Web resources.  The accountability appliances would 
serve as proxies to data sources, where they would mediate 
access to the data and maintain provenance information 
and logs of data transfers, and they would present client-
facing services to browsers, for presenting accountability 
reasoning in human readable ways, and allow annotation, 
editing, and publishing of the data and reasoning 
presented.24 
Accountability appliances must be able to reason about 
the restrictions on the use of information, and how those 
restrictions must be combined when corresponding pieces 
of information are combined.  In addition, the appliances 
will need to interact, because assessing policy compliance 
sometimes entails reasoning about long chains of data 
transfers after the fact.  These interactions present 
substantial engineering challenges: individual appliances 
should be constrained so that each operates mostly 
independently of the others, otherwise the interactions 
between the appliances will cancel out the advantages of 
distribution. 
We are still exploring that challenges associated with 
reasoning over heterogeneous policy expressions. If the 
language of data restrictions is unlimited in expressive 
power then the problem of tracking and combining 
restrictions will be computationally infeasible.  But there 
are useful policy subsets whose rules can be implemented 
in a straightforward way. One way to model this is through 
algebraic expressions involving properties of the data, the 
organizations, and the trail of data transfers, which can be 
formalized as a Data-Purpose Algebra to guide automated 
inference.25 
Even once we solve the reasoning challenges of policy 
aware systems, practical questions remain regarding the 
deployment of these technologies on the Web and in 
enterprise systems. The only scalable deployment path is 
an incremental one. Some enterprises (government 
agencies, for example) and certain online communities 
(such as scholars who use Creative Commons) could be 
early adopters of policy aware systems because of their 
pressing need to manage their own data in an accountable 
manner. It is not necessary for the entire world to adopt 
this approach right away but as these communities depend 
on data from others, the users for whom accountability is a 
priority will encourage or require other data producers to 
support policy aware systems. Experience developing the 
World Wide Web suggests that it will be essential to 
provide easy-to-use, royalty-free technical standards that 
can be implemented widely and with minimal burden. Our 
design efforts are taking into account the need for a step-
by-step deployment path. 
V.  Conclusion: Beyond information hiding 
In 1967 Alan Westin published his landmark study 
Privacy and Freedom.”26 Still in the age of mainframe 
computers and relatively small numbers of data bases, it set 
the stage for thinking about privacy over the next three 
decades.  In the book, Westin presents what has now 
become a classic definition of privacy: 
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.” 
Westin's work remains essential today for its 
identification of the role of privacy in a free society. 
However, advances in communication and information 
technology and the ease of data searching and aggregation 
have rendered this definition incomplete as a framework 
for information policy and information architectures that 
seek to be policy aware. 
In its place, information accountability through policy 
awareness, while a departure from traditional computer and 
network systems policy techniques, is actually far more 
consistent with the way that legal rules traditionally work 
in democratic societies. Computer systems depart from the 
norm of social systems in that they seek to enforce rules up 
front by precluding any possibility of violation, generally 
through the application of strong cryptographic techniques.  
In contrast, the vast majority or rules we live by have high 
levels of actual compliance without actually forcing people 
to comply. Rather we follow rules because we are aware of 
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what they are and because we know there will be 
consequences, after the fact, if we violate them, and we 
trust in our democratic systems to keep rules and 
enforcement reasonable and fair.  We believe that 
technology will better support freedom by relying on these 
social compacts rather than by seeking to supplant them. 
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